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PANEL II: INFORMATION REGULATION AND
THE FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION




Here are two examples of how copyright might, or might not, help
authors try to influence the way people see creative works:
The Ear-Slicing Song
In 1973, a short-lived band named Stealers Wheel recorded a bouncy
little pop tune called Stuck in the Middle with You. 1 In 1992, Quentin
Tarantino used the song as background music for a scene in his film,
Reservoir Dogs.2 In that scene, a thug tortures a kidnapped police officer
by beating his face bloody, slicing off his ear with a straight razor, and
dousing him with gas in preparation for setting him on fire, dancing to the
tune all the while. Before lighting the officer on fire, the thug is shot by an
undercover cop, who has been observing these events.
The scene is highly sadistic. Its incongruity with the music is brilliant
and memorable filmmaking. If you have seen the movie, it is very hard to
hear the song without thinking of the scene. Gerry Rafferty cowrote the
song with his partner Joe Eagan. He does not like violent movies.
Tarantino's people sent him a script for the movie, but Rafferty gets so
many requests to use his music that he did not pay much attention to the
scene. He and Eagan just said, in effect, "Sure, why not," and gave their
permission.3 If Rafferty had paid attention, copyright would have given
* Professor of Law, University of San Diego (dmcgowan@sandiego.edu). Thanks to Larry
Alexander, Ed Baker, Brian Bix, Julie Cohen, Justin Hughes, Dennis Karjala, Neil Netanel,
and Rebecca Tushnet for comments. Remaining mistakes are my fault.
1. Stealers Wheel, Stuck in the Middle with You, on Stealers Wheel (Leiber & Stoller
1973).
2. Reservoir Dogs (Live Entertainment & Dog Eat Dog Productions Inc. 1992).
3. DVD: Tenth Anniversary Special Limited Edition of Reservoir Dogs (Live
Entertainment & Dog Eat Dog Productions Inc. 2004) (interview with Gerry Rafferty,
songwriter).
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him the power to keep viewers of the movie from forever remembering his
work as the ear-slicing song.
The Anti-Bush Anthem (that Wasn't)
In 2004, Michael Moore's movie, Fahrenheit 9/11,4 was released. It
depicts President George W. Bush and his administration as incompetent
and immoral. The last scene shows President Bush struggling with the
ever-insurgent English language: "There's an old saying in Tennessee," he
tells reporters, and then flounders. "I know it's in Texas, probably
Tennessee. That says 'Fool me once [pause], shame on... shame on you.
[Long pause] Fool me. [Pause] You can't get fooled again."'5
Moore wanted to end the film by fading from the President's language-
wrestling and rolling the credits while playing Won't Get Fooled Again, a
well-known song by The Who. 6 The song would play off of the President's
words and at the same time reinforce Moore's message that viewers should
not get fooled into voting for President Bush in the 2004 election. This
placement of the song would invite viewers to see it as an anti-Bush
anthem. Moore asked for permission to play the song at the end of the
movie.7
Pete Townshend plays guitar for The Who. He wrote the song, and
media reports suggest he holds the rights in the composition.8 He refused
Moore's request. His motives were mixed. Moore offered much less than
the going rate to license the song.9 Townshend saw no reason to accept
such a sum. Moore's producer, Harvey Weinstein, interceded with
Townshend, describing the film to him and asking for special
consideration. 10
That didn't help. Townshend had seen one of Moore's previous films,
Bowling for Columbine,11 which caused him to distrust Moore. 12
Townshend meant Won't Get Fooled Again to express skepticism of both
politicians and revolutionaries, indeed of democracy itself, in which the
people always seem to elect politicians they find wanting.' 3 The song is
4. Fahrenheit 9/11 (Miramax Films, Dog Eat Dog Films & Fellowship Adventure
Group 2004).
5. Michael Moore Is a Bully, Says Who Guitarist, Guardian Online, July 14, 2004,
http://film.guardian.co.uk/news/story/0,12589,1261143,00.html [hereinafter Michael Moore
Is a Bully].
6. The Who, Won't Get FooledAgain, on Who's Next (MCA Records 1971).
7. Michael Moore Is a Bully, supra note 5.
8. Id. The implication of asking for Towhnshend's permission is that he holds the
rights in the composition. His permission would otherwise be unnecessary.
9. An Image Inconsistent with His Lifestyle, Canberra Times, July 17, 2004, at B09.
10. Id.
11. Bowling for Columbine (Dog Eat Dog Films 2002).
12. This view was possibly borne out by Moore's subsequent claim that Townshend
denied permission because he favored the war in Iraq. See Michael Moore Is a Bully, supra
note 5. Evidently if you are not with Moore, you are against him.
13. This explanation is from Townshend, in an entry on his weblog that has since been
removed. See An Image Inconsistent with His Lifestyle, supra note 9.
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more about Moore than for him. Moore used Neil Young's Rockin' in the
Free World instead. 14
Suppose we treat Rafferty's casual regard for his rights as representing
what the world would look like if he had no power to stop Tarantino's use
of his song, but we also keep in mind that he does not like violent movies.
1 5
These examples then represent two different ways the law can deal with
efforts people make to influence how an audience sees a work. The law
could say that works are up for grabs. Anyone could use any work to make
any point, or to try to make people see the work the way they see it.
Authors or their assignees would have no special claim. The law could say
the opposite, too.
The probable result of the first rule is that any given work would have
more meanings than if the second rule were in place, but each meaning
would likely be blearier and more diffuse than would be the case under the
second rule. The probable result of the second rule is the opposite.
These examples illustrate alternative structures of management. They do
not present one example of management and one example of freedom, nor
do they present one example of autonomy and one example of suppression.
Townshend and Tarantino both seek to influence what a work means to
people who hear it. Moore and Rafferty are both affected by these efforts.
Both examples make an important point: Audiences understand works in
light of a cluster of facts and circumstances we call context. Contexts
change, so meanings can change. People may understand a work in
different ways at different times. One way a meaning can change is for one
person to take a work and place it in a new context of their own creation,
trading on its meaning and thereby imbuing the work with their own
perceptions. In Reservoir Dogs, Rafferty is the author of the ear-slicing
song; in Fahrenheit 9/11, Townshend would be the author of the anti-Bush
anthem. Whether that happens, when it happens, and how it happens
depends in part on which of the two management structures the law adopts.
The changeability of meaning is fundamental to the relationship between
copyright and speech. Take whatever collective description of free-speech
activity you prefer: the development of common culture, 16 democratic civil
society, 17 or what have you. Call it "speech." Because meanings can
change, an author's contribution to speech may end when a work is
published, but it does not have to. If the law gives her the power, an author
14. Neil Young, Rockin' in the Free World, on Freedom (Reprise Records 1989).
15. The only difference is that, in such a world, Tarantino would not have had to pay to
use it.
16. Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech
andHow Copying Serves It, 114 Yale L.J. 535, 545-46 (2004).
17. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 Yale
L.J. 283, 285 (1996) [hereinafter Netanel, Civil Society]; Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating
Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 16 (2001) [hereinafter
Netanel, Skein]; Neil Weinstock Netanel, Market Hierarchy and Copyright in Our System of
Free Expression, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 1879, 1880-81 (2000).
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can keep on trying to manage the meaning of a work over time.
Sometimes, as with Pete Townshend, the author will succeed. 18
For this reason, when one speaker wants to use another's work, the
relevant legal rules embody a choice between two speech interests.
Because meanings can change, and because authors may affect that change,
this choice is not a choice between an author who has had his say and one
who wants to speak. It is between two people who would like to try to
make people see a certain work a certain way.
So there is good news and bad news. The good news is that whichever of
these rules, or any combination of them, the law adopts, a speech interest
will be advanced. The bad news is that whichever rule it adopts, a speech
interest will be harmed. Whether you consider it good news or bad, this
fact means that no notion of speech, and no theory of the freedom of
speech, provides a premise for preferring one rule over the other. 19
In this Essay, I want to argue that this is bad news for what I call the free-
speech critique of copyright-the scholarly call for judges to use the First
Amendment to limit Congress's power over copyright, or to give a boost to
defendants fighting infringement suits. I will use the premises I have just
outlined to explore what I see as a contradiction in the critique.
The contradiction is between realism and formalism. Like many anti-
copyright arguments these days, the free-speech critique starts out from
legal realist premises. It claims there is no such thing as truly private
action, nor any truly autonomous individuals. The critique diverges from
the path of realism, however, for two reasons. First, free-speech theory and
doctrine presume that there is such a thing as private action, and that
individuals are in fact autonomous. Free-speech theory does not work
without some version of these presumptions. Followed to their conclusion,
the critique's premises disable the free-speech doctrines they are designed
to invoke.
Second, modem free-speech doctrine is very formal. The U.S. Supreme
Court's stated standards, borrowed from equal protection law, do not
adequately express the values and interests its holdings advance. The
doctrine is a mess, but advocates of the critique embrace it anyway. They
recite the standards as if the standards mean something. They treat
18. Authors might fail in their effort to influence the way people see a work, but so
might would-be copiers such as Moore. The possibility that efforts to influence perceptions
of a work might fail cuts both ways, so it cannot resolve disputes over use of a work. The
law cannot guarantee outcomes on this point, it can only grant or withhold, to one class of
people or another, the power to try.
19. I want to disclaim any pretension that it is in any way novel to point out that rights
holders such as Townshend manage meaning in a sense relevant to free speech. I think the
point is obvious. What is interesting is why it goes unremarked in the free-speech critique.
A good example of the non-novelty of my thesis is Justin Hughes's "Recoding" Intellectual
Property and Overlooked Audience Interests, 77 Tex. L. Rev. 923 (1999), which discusses
the value of the continuity of a message over time, including the value of continuity to one
who would transform (re-code) the message.
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"intermediate scrutiny" as realists accused judges of treating "property" and
"contract."
Realists complained that judges who invoked legal categories were
inattentive to the real conflicts of values and interests the categories
affected. Most of the problems they identified had to do with distributing
gains and losses between rich and poor, powerful and weak. The problem
with the free-speech critique is worse. The categories it invokes are
designed for, and presume, a conflict between a speaker and the state, and
between speech and some other interest. They have no way to deal with
conflicts between speech interests. By relying on free-speech formalism,
the critique is inattentive to a fact that makes it incoherent.
The free-speech critique wants courts to favor one type of speaker over
another. It plays favorites. It therefore is at odds with any conception of
free speech that prohibits judges from playing favorites among speakers, as
both current doctrine and the most cogent speech theories do.
To the extent the free-speech critique admits this and makes an argument
for playing favorites, the argument is unsound. It rests on taking out of
context language that seems precise but is in fact ambiguous, and which
could be applied equally to the Raffertys and Townshends of the world as to
the Tarantinos and Moores. The argument boils down to a partial equation
of free-speech theory with populism. That equation is not a sound basis for
constitutional doctrine, and it reduces legal realism to a partisan tactic,
which it should not be.
I. THE REALIST BASES OF THE FREE-SPEECH CRITIQUE
Legal realism can be a controversial subject, so I want to begin by setting
boundaries on my use of it here. I will not argue about what realism is20 or
about who was and was not in the movement. 21 I will assert only that it is
plausible to consider the arguments I use as strands of realism. If you
disagree, then just take them at face value.
I use three arguments that I will call realist. One is that laws are
instruments of social policy, not ontological categories above politics and
policy. That idea is not uniquely realist, but realist scholars have used it to
20. Compare Roscoe Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 697
(1930) (summarizing realist work and criticizing aspects of it), with Karl N. Llewellyn, Some
Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1222, 1233-34
(1930) (criticizing Pound for issuing a blanket indictment of realism and saying that there is
no school of realists, though there was a movement).
21. For example, Professor Jack N. Balkin includes Morris Cohen in his discussion of
the relation of realist themes to free-speech arguments, though he thinks Professor Cohen
might be better described as a sympathetic critic of realism. Jack N. Balkin, Some Realism
About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990 Duke L.J. 375,
379 n.13. Professor Joseph William Singer, however, refers to Cohen as a central figure in
legal realist thought. Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 Cal. L. Rev. 465, 470
n.6 (1988).
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good effect.22 As policy tools, laws are supposed to achieve certain ends,
and legal analysis should consist of making sure that the law is achieving
the right ends as well as it can.23 Other concerns are likely to be, to borrow
from Felix Cohen's wonderful phrase, "transcendental nonsense."'24
The second argument, advanced most recently by Professor Brian Leiter,
is that realism calls for the investigation of the facts and values that
constitute "situation types" to which judges respond in deciding cases. 25
The realist predicate for this argument is that doctrinal statements often
cannot explain decisions, so additional factors must be considered. 26
Modem free-speech doctrine is a paradigmatic example of this problem.
The third realist argument (more of a tactic) is deconstructionist. Some
scholars plausibly classed as realists claimed that there is no such thing as a
"private" law, so that all laws and all actions under them can be considered
state action. In a similar vein was the claim that individuals are so
constrained by circumstances that they cannot control that the notion of a
truly autonomous person is a fiction (and a harmful one at that).27 I will
take these claims in turn.
II. DECONSTRUCTING PRIVATE ACTION
Part of realism denied any natural distinction between public and private
action. Any activity involving law is affected by state action, especially the
assertion of rights under such "private" laws as contract and property.
Some realist thinkers considered property and contract as cessions of
sovereignty by the state to individuals and firms. 28 A strong version of this
view is that the state has presumptive power to control whatever behavior it
22. As Underhill Moore put it, "A legal institution is human behavior" repeated often
enough, and in circumstances where both participants and observers recognize it as a type of
behavior. Underhill Moore, The Rational Basis of Legal Institutions, 23 Colum. L. Rev. 609,
609 (1923). This does not mean that laws are whatever any individual thinks they are. They
may be epistemologically objective, though ontologically subjective. John R. Searle, The
Construction of Social Reality 7-13 (1995).
23. Karl N. Llewellyn identified the asking of these questions as one of the tenets of
realism. Llewellyn, supra note 20, at 1236; see also Singer, supra note 21, at 474.
24. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 Colum.
L. Rev. 809 (1935).
25. Brian Leiter, Legal Realism and Legal Positivism Reconsidered, Ill Ethics 278, 281
(2001).
26. Id. On this view, realism is a combined study of judicial psychology and the
sociology and economics of fact patterns to which judges respond.
27. Some scholars, particularly those associated with the Critical Legal Studies
movement, treat these as core tenets of realism. See Singer, supra note 21, at 475. Others
treat them as peripheral. For example, in Professor Brian Leiter's view, Morris Cohen is out,
and is instead a critic of realism. Robert Hale becomes peripheral, as does the
deconstruction of the public-private distinction, and Jerome Frank's psychological interests
become more representative, though his skepticism would still be peripheral. Leiter, supra
note 25, at 280. For my purposes, it does not matter whether the elements I emphasize are
the "real" realism or only the critical legal studies-filtered kind, for the modem critique of
copyright seems to me influenced by both.
28. Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 Cornell L.Q. 8, 11 (1927).
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wants to control, and therefore can fairly be charged with acting to regulate
a given situation, whether or not it decides to intervene overtly.
The deconstruction of the public-private distinction echoes through
current copyright debates. Professor Lawrence Lessig tells us that "'private
public' law is oxymoronic," and it is no surprise to see him cite Robert Hale
and Morris Cohen for this point.29 Scholars unhappy with form copyright
licenses call them a form of "private legislation," a term borrowed from
Friedrich Kessler's famous assault on form agreements. 30
It is of course easy to say that the idea of "private public law" is
incoherent. Indeed, it is so easy that it amounts to wordplay masquerading
as analysis. That some laws allow people to make choices the government
will respect and enforce does not mean that those laws, or choices made
under them, are equivalent to choices made by state officials. Subject to
some limitations, the state will recognize your choice of a spouse. It does
not follow that your marriage is no different than it would have been had a
state official made the choice for you. Similarly, it is no doubt true that
legal institutions such as property allow some people to accumulate riches
they can use to broadcast their views more effectively than poor people, but
it does not follow that this speech situation is equivalent to one in which
government officials decide who gets to say what.
Realist scholars do not assert such ridiculous claims. They are best read
as insisting that the real question is not whether laws are public or private in
some abstract sense, but whether it would be desirable to treat an action as
if it were taken by the state or by a private person. Legal catchphrases
should not substitute for such analysis. It is hard to argue with that idea,
even if it shows up the easy rhetoric of state action--"private legislation"
and all that-as every bit as hollow as the legal categories the rhetoric is
designed to displace.
A. State Action and the Free-Speech Critique
Deconstruction of the public-private distinction is a necessary element of
the free-speech critique of copyright. The critique cannot get off the ground
unless it treats as state action Congress's grant of rights to individuals and,
in at least some cases, the decision of a rights holder to bring an
infringement action or in some other way assert his or her statutory rights.
The free-speech critique has two approaches to the state action question.
One is by-the-numbers formalism: (1) Copyright is a law, (2) that grants
rights in expression, (3) which may lead to lawsuits that require state actors
(judges) to evaluate the expression of an alleged infringer, (4) with an eye
29. Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 Harv. L.
Rev. 501, 531 & n.97 (1999).
30. For the critique, see Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap
Licenses, 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1239, 1274 n.158 (1995) (citing Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of
Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 Colum. L. Rev. 629 (1943)).
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to possibly enjoining distribution of that expression or fining its publisher,
ergo (5) copyright is state action that regulates speech. QED. 31
There is little to be said for this approach. For example, in this argument
the term "expression" is ambiguous. Much copyrighted expression, such as
executable computer code, is not protected speech.32 Much protected
speech, such as ideas, 33 marches, unfixed street-corner rants, 34 readings of
poetry in the park, 35 and the distribution or modification of works by
government officials, 36 is not vulnerable to infringement suits, if it is
subject to copyright at all.
This approach also uses the term "evaluate" ambiguously. The classic
free-speech worry is that government officials will evaluate speech to see
whether it suits them, and suppress or penalize speech that does not. Judges
evaluating infringement claims do not judge the merit or acceptability of
speech. They compare the defendant's speech to the plaintiffs. Comparing
the speech of two parties, and penalizing copying of whatever content or
viewpoint, does not pose the same risks as reviewing speech to see whether
it is to the government's taste. It has no ideological valence. Any argument
that collapses these different types of review misses more about free speech
than it reveals.
The leading proponent of this argument, Professor C. Edwin Baker, starts
with the premise that all speech is presumptively protected, so that laws
restricting what a person wants to say are presumptively unconstitutional.
Anyone has a right to say anything, even if what they want to say is what
someone else has said. According to Baker, "[s]peech freedom is an
embodiment of one of the most fundamental human values, the right of an
individual to make her own choices about the values she expresses." 37
The premise of this argument is too broad-many, if not most, speech
acts, such as contracts, bribes, threats, blackmail, price-fixing, and so on are
not protected speech. 38 More fundamentally, this argument does not work
because it ignores the speaker whose words are copied. That speaker has as
much normative claim as any other. Townshend would like to "make [his]
own choices about the values" his song expresses, and there is no reason his
31. C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 Vand. L. Rev. 891, 900
(2002).
32. E.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Vartuli, 228 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2000)
(rejecting a speech claim as applied to regulation of the foreign currency trading program).
For an extended discussion of this subject, see David McGowan, From Social Friction to
Social Meaning: What Expressive Uses of Code Tell Us About Free Speech, 64 Ohio St. L.J.
1515 (2003).
33. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
34. Id. § 102(a).
35. Id. § 110(4). One might argue that Congress could choose to extend exclusive rights
to such readings, and that doing so would create free-speech problems. That is a cogent
claim. My point here is only to trace the outlines of current copyright law relative to current
understandings of what counts as free speech.
36. Id. § 105.
37. Baker, supra note 31, at 897.
38. See David McGowan, Approximately Speech, 89 Minn. L. Rev. 1416 (2005).
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choice is less "fundamental," or what-have-you, than Moore's desire to
make Townshend's song stand for Moore's message. 39 Townshend objects
to Moore's message, so to let Moore copy the song is to let him make his
speech choice at the expense of Townshend's.
Whatever else one might say about this dispute, it cannot be resolved on
the grounds of autonomy or freedom of choice, because here the choices
and interests of each party conflict. Nor, as noted at the outset, can one
resolve the conflict on the ground that Moore is "speaking" and Townshend
is not. What is at issue is a conflict between the coherence of a message-
Townshend's anti-demagogue message-and its diversity of its possible
meanings-Moore's demagogic use (as Townshend sees it) of the anti-
demagogue song. Both coherence and diversity contribute to "public
discourse," the "marketplace of ideas," or whatever you want to call the
aggregation of individual acts of protected speech. The notion that speech
is good and restraint is bad therefore provides no basis for resolving a
conflict between these values.
The only way to cast Moore as speaking and Townshend as not speaking
is to say that the value of speech lies in the physical act of copying a song
onto a movie soundtrack or, more generally, in moving one's lips, hands, or
legs in a way that people can recognize as expressive. Moore wants to run
the copier for his soundtrack; Townshend wants to stop it (though he runs it
himself in other contexts). But it makes no sense to say that the act of
running a machine, the strictly physical side of producing expression, is
what free speech is all about.40 There is supposed to be something special
about speech that justifies us in refusing to enforce laws that restrict it.
Moore's copying is different from a mechanic's alignment tools because we
recognize Moore's output, and not the mechanic's, as speech.
39. Cf Baker, supra note 31, at 897.
40. Pure autonomy arguments, which might support a view of free speech divorced from
its effects, tend to fall apart on practical grounds. Autonomy means people should be able to
do what they want, but when what they want to do is socially costly, even the most devoted
autonomy aficionado finds ways to limit the notion of autonomy to accommodate regulation
that is needed to avoid social losses. Professor Baker, for example, is inclined to allow
people to copy content if they plan to give it away, but not if they plan to sell it in a market
transaction. Baker, supra note 31, at 902. He says that "[f]reedom to act (e.g., to speak) and
to alienate (e.g., to provide another with your communication) are direct aspects of personal
liberty. In contrast, market transactions are exercises of power over other people." Id. How
do we know this? We do not; it is stipulated. I think this dichotomy does not hold up in
either direction. Economic liberties-including market transactions-are at least plausibly
part of any notion of freedom, autonomy, or what-have-you. The division of labor, and the
market transactions it implies, does not negate liberty or individual autonomy. The lesson of
the twentieth century is just the opposite. And nonmarket behavior can be highly
instrumental. Since Aristotle, people have studied rhetoric as a way of exercising power
over others. It may be the power of reasoned argument, or it may be the power of the
sophist, but lots of speech is instrumental in the sense that the speaker wants to persuade a
listener to do something in the speaker's interests. And it may well be instrumental in the
further sense that the speaker wants to trick the listener into doing so, or to shock and offend
them. The dichotomy between instrumental expression, or assertions of power, on the one
hand, and "liberty," on the other, is unsound.
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The problem for Professor Baker's theory is that we recognize
Townshend's output as speech, too. Townshend's outputs initially
consisted of both what he put into the song and what he left out. No one
would say (or if they did it would be baseless) that Moore could come into
Townshend's recording studio and insist that Townshend spin the song to
damn President Bush. The same principle applies to efforts to manage
perceptions of a song over time. Once we recognize that meanings change
with contexts, it follows that Townshend's management of his song (if the
law lets him try to manage it) makes him a marginal speaker in the sense of
one who manages the relation between a text (the song) and context.
Management over time is not quite the same as an initial recording-once
that recording is fixed and released there is at least one publicly accessible
and constant version (though Townshend could record a new one)-but that
does not mean that the choice to keep a text out of a context is not a choice
to advance a meaning, and thus to advance free-speech values. There is no
particular reason to deny that Townshend's choice not to voice Moore's
message, even if that choice is implemented by not copying instead of
copying, advances such values. 41 By-the-numbers formalism does not
work.
The critique's second approach to state action argues that copyright is so
tightly bound up with speech that its effects justify treating copyright itself,
and suits under it, as state action. This argument is not as bad as the formal
approach, but it is not very persuasive either.
Effects-based arguments have a hard time supplying a principle for
determining when a law or act should be treated as state action and when it
should not. All laws affect expression,42 so the fact of an effect cannot
itself determine which acts should be treated as public and which as private.
Some effects are bigger than others, so one could try using the size of
effects to decide this question. But that is harder than it sounds.
General laws, such as contract and property, have fundamental and
pervasive effects on pretty much everything everyone does, including
expression. 43 The effects may be hard to see, accustomed as we are to
taking property rights for granted as part of the background against which
41. This argument might strike many people as odd. Many will want to say that it is true
that Moore could not and should not be able to interfere with the original recording of
Townshend's song, but that the situation is different once Townshend releases his work.
Once released, the work is part of common culture and everyone should be able to use it.
That is just an assertion, however; it is the thing to be proved, not a proof.
42. Larry A. Alexander, Trouble on Track Two: Incidental Regulations of Speech and
Free Speech Theory, 44 Hastings L.J. 921, 927 (1993).
43. Suppose you own the only theater in town and refuse to rent it out for a production
of Hair because you dislike the play. Or suppose you own a Gaugin and refuse to lend it to
an exhibition claiming to show how Van Gogh and Gaugin influenced each other, because
you think that claim is rubbish. Each example is logically equivalent to copyright; neither
would present a free-speech problem in the eyes of most courts. Multiplied across all forums
for expression and all expressive objects, such effects are huge.
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speech occurs, but they are there.44 If the size of speech effects justifies
treating the assertion of a right as state action, the free-speech critique
commits judges to free-speech review of at least property in realty and
chattel, and contract law.45
The free-speech critique tries to get around this problem by abandoning
direct effects analysis and circling back to the structure of the laws in
question and the motive of the state in enacting them. For example,
Professor Neil Weinstock Netanel says that real property rights do not have
to be treated as state action subject to free-speech review because those
regulations are "general" and "impose only isolated and incidental burdens
on speech." 46
These distinctions are weak. There is no reason to believe that a general
regulation would have a smaller effect than a more particular one; law,
logic, and common sense point the other way. There is no fair use defense
to trespass to realty, nor any concept of merger that will erase a real
property line. This claim implies that constitutionalizing fair use would
have greater speech effects than a decision creating in every deed a free-
speech easement in favor of the public. Not likely. 47 The claim that the
speech effects of property rules are "isolated" is hard to comprehend; they
are pervasive.
To the extent that the generality of property rules has anything to do with
treating copyright as state action, the free-speech critique gets the
relationship backwards. Copyright's effects on speech are less pervasive
than the effects of property rights in realty or chattel, so free-speech review
of copyright would be less disruptive, and thus more palatable, than free-
speech review of more general laws. That is a cogent argument, but it
contradicts rather than supports the effects approach to state action.
The claim that property rules impose only "incidental" burdens on speech
is best read as referring to the state's motive in adopting such rules. The
generality argument can be read the same way-the point is not that
property has fewer speech effects than copyright, but that those effects are
by-products of more general governmental aims.
The First Amendment does worry about government motive, but, as we
have seen, that concern has to do with governmental approval or
disapproval of content, not with the comparison of one speaker's content
44. David McGowan, Why the First Amendment Cannot Dictate Copyright Policy, 65 U.
Pitt. L. Rev. 281, 299 (2004).
45. The Supreme Court dallied with such an idea in the contract context in Cohen v.
Cowles Media Co., but refused to take that step, even though enforcement of the promise in
that case penalized publication of core speech. 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
46. Netanel, Skein, supra note 17, at 39.
47. None of this implies that laws pertaining to realty or chattel should be models for
copyright. The use of creative works is non-rivalrous, which illustrates a big difference
between works and tangible property. My point here is only that these laws have profound
effects on speech-much greater effects than Professor Netanel lets on. If the critique is
really selling an effects-based view of state action, it has committed to judicial free-speech
review of quite a lot of law.
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with another's. 48 More fundamentally, the government's actual motive in
adopting copyright is to promote expression. 49 The means it has adopted
entail suppression of certain types of expression, it is true, but that point
goes to the effects of the law, not to the government's aim.50 As we have
seen, the effects-based argument for state action is unsound. For these
reasons, Professor Netanel's curiously passive conclusion that "where
property rights are not in land, but in information, expression, or
communicative capacity, they are more properly characterized as speech
regulations" 51 is unpersuasive. Neither formalism nor effects-based
analysis justifies it.
Against this analysis one might argue that it is obvious that both the
Copyright Act 52 and judicial enforcement of it are state action, and that no
one thinks otherwise. It is simply wrong and a mistake to raise this issue at
all. Supreme Court doctrine supports this view.53
In my view, however, putting the matter this way proves part of my
point. Advocates of the free-speech critique think and assert that copyright
is state action in just the same way-"it's obvious"--that Lochner-era
judges were accused of treating property and contract as private action. The
doctrine is accepted uncritically, and the sort of normative state action
arguments I offer here are not discussed. Yet New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan,54 the source of this rule, disposed of the state action issue crudely,
by noting that libel is a law, and libel actions invoke the power of the law.
That view is far too broad, because it erases any difference between actions
initiated by private citizens and actions initiated by government officials. It
equates libel actions with censorship, and that is simply sloppy analysis. A
court might well reach the same conclusions with respect to each type of
case, but the interests at stake and the risks of regulation are different, so the
reasoning needs to be different. 55 Treating copyright suits as state action
48. The key doctrinal inquiry is "whether the government has adopted a regulation of
speech because of [agreement or] disagreement with the message it conveys." Turner Broad.
Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994), opinion following remand, 520 U.S. 180
(1997).
49. Cf Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 589 (1985)
(referring to copyright as the "engine of free expression").
50. It might be that advocates of the free-speech critique have ideas that could improve
copyright's ratio of speech creation to speech suppression, but that is a different argument
from either effects or motives.
51. Netanel, Skein, supra note 17, at 39.
52. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (2000).
53. E.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 668 (1991) (finding that a
promissory estoppel claim amounted to state action because "the application of state rules of
law in state courts in a manner alleged to restrict First Amendment freedoms constitutes
'state action' under the Fourteenth Amendment").
54. 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964).
55. The Times Court's casual analysis was suited to that case, which was one of a
number of cases brought by government officials in an obviously pretextual effort to thwart
coverage of the civil rights movement, which those officials opposed. See McGowan, supra
note 44, at 302-03. But while censorial suits by government officials ashamed of their
actions do present the quintessential free-speech worry-censorship by government actors-
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makes this problem even harder because, as we have seen, both parties in
these cases advance free-speech values and therefore can claim to advance
First Amendment interests.
This point may be a small one, because advocates of the critique do
address what I call state action arguments when they discuss the distinction
between general and specific laws. The point in each case is to ask whether
a specific law or lawsuit should be treated as especially threatening to free-
speech values, such that society would be better off if judges used the First
Amendment to limit the power of representative bodies in drafting the law
and the power of private parties in enforcing it.
And here is where the small point is important. It is false to say that
copyright "targets" protected speech. The rights do not distinguish between
protected and unprotected expression. Specific suits target speech, but in
general these are not brought by government officials. They are brought by
rights holders, as a trespass action would be brought by a landowner. 56 For
all the similarities in analysis, employing the language of general and
specific regulations obscures a fact that a straightforward state-action
analysis would stress: To the extent that there is "targeting," or potentially
worrisome motives, they involve private rights holders, who probably are
after revenue or their own artistic vision, and not government officials
trying to feather their nests, hide their misdeeds, or perpetuate their
power.57
such suits are not the modal libel action, and certainly not the modal copyright action. The
Times treatment of state action is a perfect example of a rule offhandedly created to meet a
genuine need and then extended to very different circumstances in which that need does not
exist. One could of course still favor the Times rule-that a public figure alleging libel must
demonstrate that the defendant published with actual malice-on the ground that speech is
more important than reputation, but that is a different argument from the censorship risk
genuinely presented in that case.
56. The Supreme Court's opinion in Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York,
Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002), highlights the significance of the difference
between state support of actions initiated by private parties and state action. The regulation
in question required solicitors to obtain a permit from the city and allowed homeowners to
register with the city and post notices on their homes, denying solicitors permission to enter
their property. The Court struck down the permitting portion of the regulation; plaintiffs did
not even challenge the homeowner-initiated portion. Id. at 156. The Court referred to this
section as providing an alternative that could advance the city's interests in guarding the
privacy of its residents and in protecting them from scam artists in a less restrictive way than
granting government permission. That homeowners could squelch a form of solicitation to
which the Court paid lengthy homage illustrates again the speech-suppressing power of
property law. The difference in the case is between suppression initiated by a private citizen
and permission mandated by a government official. In terms applicable to Times, it is the
difference between a libel action filed by a private person and one filed by a government
official.
57. This fact does not mean that current copyright law, or any conceivable legal regime,
could be "neutral" in the sense of not affecting what gets said or heard, and in each case by
whom. That is impossible. But the impossibility of such neutrality does not imply that all
regimes are equally good. It is no license to set judges to the task of doing their best for the
type of speaker one favors. If nothing else, adopting such a view undercuts most objections
to the distortions of the status quo. The question is what approach best approximates the
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It is good to remember that the point of this discussion is to determine
whether society would be better off treating a law, and assertions of it, as
public or private. Insofar as applications of the law are concerned, 58 in the
cases of greatest interest to the critique, there will be two speech claims:
one by an original author or his assignee, and one by a subsequent author
who would like to copy from and do something with the prior work.
Treating copyright as state action helps copiers (who may also be highly
original transformers of works, but whose only liability risk is for copying)
as against those whose work they copy; it helps defendants by making life
harder for plaintiffs. This result would only benefit society as a whole if the
speech interests of defendants were systematically greater than the interests
of plaintiffs. The state action portion of the free-speech critique offers no
reason to accept this claim.
B. State Action and Free-Speech Theory
The free-speech critique does not present a strong case for treating
assertions of copyright as state action. Even the case for treating the statute
itself as a "regulation of speech" is very wobbly. But even if you are
inclined to accept the critique, it then faces a conundrum of its own
creation. It deconstructs the notion of private action in order to avail itself
of free-speech doctrine, which must treat speech as private action.
Democratic theories of free speech illustrate this relationship most
clearly. The political justification for free speech is that it allows people to
form and voice opinions to which government then responds. 59  If
everything is state action, however, including the acts of people who speak,
then the notion of state responsiveness is incoherent. The state would
respond to itself. It could do that, but it does not have to, and nothing
important would be lost if it did not. State regulation of speech would do
no more than fine-tune the outputs of the state policies that created the
speech. 60
Nonpolitical theories of free speech also have to treat expression as if it is
private action. Claims that speech enhances autonomy, or self-something
(realization, actualization, and discovery are the usual candidates) fall apart
if speech is the act of the state and not the person (a point I revisit below).
unattainable goal of neutrality, and in particular what approach minimizes the risk of
government officials, including judges, playing favorites with speakers.
58. Applications of the law are different from facial challenges, where the question is
really only whether judges can write better laws than Congress. It is this aspect of the claim
that makes advocates of the critique defenders of Lochner-like judging; the only difference is
the ideology they prefer. See infra text accompanying notes 124-26. At a practical level,
there is no particular reason to believe that judges can write better copyright laws than
Congress, especially when institutional considerations suggest that they cannot, and they say
that themselves. McGowan, supra note 44, at 332-38.
59. For a general discussion of this point, see Robert C. Post, Meiklejohn's Mistake:
Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public Discourse, 64 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1109, 1124-
25 (1993).
60. Id. at 1128.
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Even claims that speech promotes truth make little sense if speech
expresses only policy.
These considerations tend to turn the state action element of the free-
speech critique on its head. The critique tries to limit its scope, and thus
avoid the burden of rewriting all laws, by emphasizing the tightness of the
fit between copyright and speech. But because the First Amendment cannot
operate without a conception of private action, the tightness of this fit
makes it harder to treat copyright and assertions of it as state rather than
private action.
III. DECONSTRUCTING INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY
Some leading realists rejected the notion that people are autonomous
individuals, at least insofar as that notion might be used to justify classical
notions of property and contract. On the demand side, realists tended to
view consumers as weak and vulnerable to the oppressive economic power
of producers. For example, Morris Cohen claimed that "those who have the
power to standardize and advertise certain products ... determine what we
may buy and use."6 1 It was the "modem owner of capital" who had the
power "to make us feel the necessity of buying more and more of his
material goods."'62
On the supply side, neither workers nor producers were autonomous in
any meaningful sense. Cohen dispensed with the Lockean argument for
property by asserting that "social interdependence is so intimate that no
man can justly say: 'This wealth is entirely and absolutely mine as the
result of my own unaided effort.' 63 Robert Hale's view of law as coercion,
and of all exchanges as being coerced by law, 64 was to the same effect.
A. Autonomy in Copyright Arguments
To set the stage for the free-speech critique's treatment of autonomy, I
want to look for a moment at how autonomy is treated in other modem
copyright arguments. On the supply side, an important strand of modem
copyright criticism seeks to discredit the notion that people create works
from their own artistic genius. Professor Jessica Litman argues that
"copyright law is based on the charming notion that authors create
something from nothing, that works owe their origin to the authors who
produce them."'65 As she sees it, the truth is that all authors seek to express
views that are shaped by "experiences, by the other works of authorship she
has absorbed (which are also her experiences), and by the interaction
61. Cohen, supra note 28, at 13.
62. Id. at 14.
63. Id. at 17.
64. Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 Colum. L. Rev. 603,
605 (1943).
65. Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 Emory L.J. 965, 965 (1990).
2005]
FORDHAM LA W REVIEW
between the two."' 66 The upshot is that "[o]riginality is a conceit, but we
like it."6 7
On the demand side, the main arguments against the notion of autonomy
are reliance and oppression. With regard to the former, Professors Wendy
Gordon and Jeremy Waldron each attack Lockean justifications for
copyright by asserting that consumers come to rely on works. In a way
similar to the arguments of Morris Cohen, this argument casts consumers as
being in a dependent relationship with producers, and therefore vulnerable
to harm if producers exercise their rights to exclude.68 For example,
Professor Gordon writes that "[s]ome poems, some ideas, some works of
art, become 'part of me' in such a way that if I cannot use them, I feel I am
cut off from part of myself. '69
B. Autonomy in the Free-Speech Critique
With regard to oppression, Professors Yochai Benkler and Neil
Weinstock Netanel both suggest that big media conglomerates wield
copyright to keep consumers and transformative users under their thumb.
Professor Benkler rightly believes there are no strictly autonomous
people,70 but he quite sensibly argues that different laws affect autonomy
differently. Laws, such as copyright, that give one person the power to
control information another receives conflict with the second person's
autonomy.7' Professor Benkler does not think the person doing the
restricting has any autonomy interest in the restriction.72
Professor Netanel follows a slightly different route to much the same
place. He is concerned with an idea he calls democratic civil society.73
That society thrives when people are engaged and autonomous, and it
suffers when people are subordinates in authoritarian relations, which are
66. Id. at 1010.
67. Id at 1019. It is a bit much to call originality a romanticized conceit. One could say
the same of many odes to the public domain. It would be better to say that the law treats
authors generally as if they do individually original work, even if originality is rare, hard to
spot, varies among authors, and on some definitions might not exist at all. The structure of
the Copyright Act does not entail what Professor Litman derides as conceit; it simply
employs a particular form of "as if" treatment. That treatment might or might not be
justifiable or adequately justified, and Professor Litman is dead right to focus attention on
that question. But calling it a romanticized conceit detracts more from the needed analysis
than it adds.
68. Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism
in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 Yale L.J. 1533, 1582-91 (1993); Jeremy
Waldron, From Authors to Copiers: Individual Rights and Social Values in Intellectual
Property, 68 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 841, 867 (1993).
69. Gordon, supra note 68, at 1569 (emphasis omitted).
70. Yochai Benkler, Siren Songs and Amish Children: Autonomy, Information, and
Law, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 23, 34 (2001).
71. Id. at49.
72. Id.
73. That is, "the sphere of voluntary, nongovernmental association in which individuals
determine their shared purposes and norms." Netanel, Civil Society, supra note 17, at 342.
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those in which one person has power over another.74 Professor Netanel
applies this somewhat diffuse concept to copyright law in a sophisticated
and nuanced way. Copyright can help people raise capital and create power
to counter that of the government, which is good, but it can also help people
keep other people down, which is bad.
In both arguments, autonomy is a one-way street. Townshend's refusal
impinges on Moore's autonomy, but Tarantino's film does nothing to
Rafferty. Should the law allow Moore to use Won't Get Fooled Again
against Townshend's will, to try to make it stand for something Townshend
opposes, Townshend's autonomy would be untouched.
Each argument treats this point as obvious, but I think it is not. Logic
does not compel this conclusion, and it is unsatisfying to solve the problem
with stipulations that simply define "autonomy" or "civil society" to
exclude authors once they have published. 75 Nor, for that matter, is
"autonomy" an obviously apt phrase to describe what is at stake when
someone wants to reproduce or modify work that someone else has done. 76
At first glance, it might seem that realism could support this claim. For
example, Robert Hale saw property rights as threatened coercion by the
government to protect the quiet enjoyment of owners. 77 That view implies
that private parties coerce each other by exercising state-granted rights.78
But Hale, who was quite candid in saying that the employee coerces the
employer by threatening to withhold labor, just as the employer coerces the
employee by threatening to withhold wages, 79 would be the first to admit
that one could run the autonomy argument in either direction.
One could say it is authoritarianism for the law to back up Townshend's
decision to say "no" to Moore, but one could just as well say it is
authoritarianism for the law to back up Tarantino's decision to impress his
ebulliently sadistic vision on Gerry Rafferty's song.80 In what sense is
Rafferty less under Tarantino's thumb than Moore is under Townshend's? 81
These arguments might provide reasons for treating both sides of such
74. Id. at 342-43.
75. Cf Benkler, supra note 70, at 67 (denying that authors have autonomy interests in
their works).
76. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219-21 (2003) (stating that free-speech values
have less force when a party copies rather than creates expression).
77. Robert Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 Pol.
Sci. Q. 470, 471-72 (1923).
78. Hale, supra note 64, at 606.
79. Hale, supra note 77, at 474.
80. This assumes once again that the law did not require Tarantino to get permission
from Rafferty.
81. As we have seen, the formalist view-that Moore is physically doing things we
recognize as "speech" and Townshend is not-will not hold up. Whatever one thinks the
First Amendment aims to protect, it is not the act of running a mixing machine. The
formalist view therefore either fails to explain why speech should be treated differently from
car repair, or fails to offer a reason to favor one speaker over another.
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disputes as either autonomous or oppressed; they do not provide reasons for
distinguishing between the two.82
Autonomy receives more complex treatment than state action in the free-
speech critique, but to the extent the concept supports the critique, it does so
by arguing that the law give rights holders too much power over
transformative users, who therefore should be treated as oppressed rather
than as autonomous persons. Their work may not reflect their true vision,
but only that portion of their vision that has escaped copyright's clutches.
They may mean Won't Get Fooled Again but be forced to say Keep on
Rockin' in the Free World. The critique treats rights holders as if this were
true.
C. Autonomy in Free-Speech Theory
At the end of Part II, I argued that the free-speech critique of copyright is
in a dilemma because it has to deconstruct the distinction between public
and private action while free-speech law must treat speech as private. I now
want to argue essentially the same point about autonomy. Any coherent
theory of free speech must treat people as if they are autonomous beings,
even if they in fact labor under all sorts of constraints. Indeed, free-speech
theory must treat them that way even if the notion of autonomy is a
complete fiction.
The reason for this is similar to the state action argument. If people are
not really autonomous, but instead are conduits for social forces that weigh
upon them, or complex functions whose outputs are dictated by socially
constructed inputs, then there is no particular reason to take their speech as
expressing interests that are meaningfully theirs. There is no reason why
they should have a stake in participating in "self government," because
there is no self at stake-no "individual" contribution to be made, and no
individual identity to be developed.8 3 By parity of reasoning, there would
be no individual cost to restricting speech.
To look at the point another way, if the individual is socially constructed
rather than autonomous, then a restriction on speech is just one way of
constructing individuals. It would be hard to deny that severe restrictions
on depictions of nudity, bad language, violence, and so on would produce a
different social atmosphere-and thus by the logic of this argument a
different type of person-than the atmosphere we have now. If we throw
autonomy out the window, that atmosphere cannot be defended on the
82. Certainly one could say that Rafferty is free to defend his vision by any means other
than denying permission to Tarantino; Rafferty could rerecord the song, for example, or start
a blog explaining how Tarantino had distorted his intended meaning. But this is not an
argument. One can say anything. One could say that Rafferty has to take the bitter of
Tarantino's treatment of his song in return for the sweet of being able to write in the first
place. Or one could say Moore has to take the bitter of Townshend's refusal in return for the
sweet of his own rights. Neither statement has any analytical content; without more, each is
just a way of expressing a preference.
83. See Post, supra note 59, at 1128-31.
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ground that it reflects the aggregate interests of people who produce and
consume speech. Their interests are not their own, but what society has
thrust upon them. On this view, protecting speech would be one way for
society to construct its members, but it would have no special status. In
restricting speech, the majority does no harm to individuals; it just
constructs them differently.
Free-speech doctrine is, of course, just the opposite. Whatever people
may in fact be, it treats them as if they are autonomous individuals. If
anything, the free-speech romanticizing of individual autonomy goes far
beyond what Professor Jessica Litman derides as copyright law's
romanticizing of authors. What the Supreme Court recently described as
"the heart of the First Amendment"-"the principle that each person should
decide for himself or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression,
consideration, and adherence" 84-makes no sense at all if the notion of a
person deciding for herself is risible.
This fact makes free-speech doctrine relatively unfriendly turf for
launching an assault on copyright. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg put the
matter bluntly in Eldred v. Ashcroft: "The First Amendment securely
protects the freedom to make-or decline to make-one's own speech; it
bears less heavily when speakers assert the right to make other people's
speeches." 85 As with the notion of a person deciding for herself what ideas
to believe, if there is no such thing as one's own speech, and if everything
one says is the speech of others, then this comment makes no sense.
Not surprisingly, some advocates take just that view. When the free-
speech critique's realist deconstruction of autonomy runs into free-speech
theory's necessary embrace of autonomy, the natural response is to try to
water down the conception of autonomy that free-speech theory employs.
The weaker that conception is, the better the free-speech critique works.
Thus, Professor Rebecca Tushnet levels complaints at free-speech doctrine
that parallel Professor Litman's critique of authorship. She decries the
"reigning model of free speech" with its "particular kind of individualism"
that leads courts wrongly to focus on "the individual on his soapbox" and
assume "that the individual's speech is entirely self-generated rather than
assembled from pre-existing cultural resources. '8 6
Professor Tushnet is right to say that individualism is the dominant
methodological assumption of free-speech doctrine. She is also right to say
that free-speech doctrine does not have to presume that all speech is original
to the speaker. It could be a question of degree. There is a price to pay for
watering down the Court's free-speech individualism, however. To the
extent we treat expression as the recycling of existing works with no
84. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 220 (2003) (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v.
FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994)).
85. Id. at 221.
86. Tushnet, supra note 16, at 567.
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element of the individual on his soapbox, then, to that extent, there is no
cost to individual freedom by restricting one's speech.
Put differently, Professor Tushnet wants people to be freer to contribute
to "common culture" 87 than she thinks they are under current free-speech
doctrine (including here what she sees as its effects on current fair use
doctrine). But if there really is no such thing as an individual perspective,
then why is greater participation in common culture valuable? What is lost
in limiting such participation? Why should we care if a regurgitation
function "participates" in anything; indeed, what could that mean?
I think the answer to these questions is that no one really believes that
individual speakers are no more than social conduits. Creativity and
imagination may be unevenly distributed, they may exist along various
continuums in various expressive endeavors, and the ratio of copied to
original expression may be very high in some works. Originality may
consist in little more than reproducing a work in a context that alters the
way viewers see it.88 All this may be true, but these ideas still have
substance. They are not romantic myths we like to tell ourselves to make
ourselves happy.
Even if all that is wrong, however, judges who give meaning to the First
Amendment have to choose whether to decide cases as if it were right.
Free-speech doctrine that rests on an assumption of individual autonomy
will tend to curb restrictions of speech more than a doctrine that rests on the
assumption that individuals are something else. To the extent the law treats
people as so dependent on culture that they cannot speak without copying,
the law has less reason to respect what people say as reflecting a preference
that is their own. Either way, these points lead to the same conclusion:
With regard to autonomy, the free-speech critique is at odds with free-
speech theory.
Against all this, one might argue that stripping away the fiction of the
autonomous individual would not lead to illiberal speech law. All it would
do, the argument would go, is refocus doctrine away from the individual
and toward what Professor Robert C. Post has called "collectivist" notions
87. I regard this abstraction with great skepticism. I doubt that most things one would
consider elements of culture are common in the sense that majorities of people consume
them. Culture is more localized than that, on both geographic and demographic lines. To
take only one example, the tremendously successful television show Seinfeld was never
among the top fifty shows watched by black viewers. Roland G. Freyer, Jr. & Steven D.
Levitt, The Causes and Consequences of Distinctively Black Names, 119 Q. J. Econ. 767,
768 (2004). Academics (including me) are terrible cultural snobs, and snobbishness consists
precisely in not consuming a large fraction of cultural elements. Don't believe me? Quick,
name one song by Ernest Tubb. I bet you can't. Though I would also bet you can guess his
style of music. If "common" in this argument means only some large group of people,
falling far short of even a majority, which I suspect it does, then it substitutes for analysis
rather than expressing it.
88. Professor Tushnet thinks courts are insensitive to the role of context in meaning; I
think courts do a better job than she allows. See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain
Prods., 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003).
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of free speech,89 such as the robustness of democratic civil society in
Professor Netanel's argument, 90 or the development of common culture in
Professor Tushnet's argument. 91 Instead of "defend the speech rights of the
individual as against the state," the free-speech bumper sticker would read:
"Manage laws affecting public discourse to produce vibrant common
culture in a democratic civil society."
These notions are very abstract and, therefore, hard to pin down or
measure. To the extent they can be made concrete, they refer either to the
net effects of the actions and interactions of real people or to the personal
preferences of whoever wields the phrases, be it a scholar or a judge. There
is no other option. The personal preferences of scholars and judges provide
no legitimate basis for any law. That leaves the net effects of the
interactions of people subject to some rule.
At this point, the collectivist argument collapses back into some
conception of autonomy, if only insofar as autonomy is a useful assumption
to generate information (revealed preferences) about what the collective
good really is. Like its predecessor, the free-speech argument for
restrictions on racist speech (which was plausibly accused of silencing its
targets),92 when the free-speech critique of copyright descends from the
heights of abstraction, it asserts the claim of one speaker over another. It is,
if you will pardon the phrase, the same old song: Moore has rights;
Townshend oppresses. Collectivist theory rises or falls with the plausibility
of that claim.
IV. FORMALISM, POPULISM, AND SPEECH
The argument so far shows that the free-speech critique of copyright has
an odd feature. It is designed to bring the First Amendment into the
copyright fight; however, once free-speech theory arrives, it rejects the
premises used to bring it in. What good is that?
I believe the answer lies in the unfortunate detachment of free-speech
doctrine from the values and interests it is supposed to express. This
detachment is responsible for the widely accepted conclusion that free-
speech doctrine is a mess.93 The fault can be traced to Police Department
of Chicago v. Mosley,94 which imported equal protection modes of analysis
to free-speech doctrine. 95 First Amendment doctrine consists of categories
89. Post, supra note 59, at 1109.
90. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
91. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
92. E.g., Charles R. Lawrence, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on
Campus, 1990 Duke L.J. 431,436 (1990).
93. E.g., Robert C. Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 Stan. L. Rev.
1249, 1270-79 (1995) (arguing that the Court's First Amendment language does not
accurately express the values its decisions embody).
94. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
95. Id. at 96. For more on this incorporation, see McGowan, supra note 44, at 293-94.
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and tiers of scrutiny that focus on laws and their motivations, rather than on
the sociology of speech acts and their attendant costs and benefits.
The result is a free-speech doctrine that does not adequately express the
theories and values judges enforce in free-speech cases. It is precisely this
aspect of free-speech doctrine that invites what Professor Leiter sees as the
core critique of realism: When doctrine cannot explain results, analysis
should focus on the elements that make up the "situations" to which judges
respond. 96
At least in its current form, however, the free-speech critique trades on
precisely this aspect of the doctrine. The critique takes the Court's
categorical language out of the context of the cases in which that language
is used and applies it to disputes between authors. Professor Netanel
provides a particularly clear example of this aspect of the critique:
Since the 1970's, category-specific analysis has come to play a central
role in First Amendment and other constitutional jurisprudence. In
considering First Amendment challenges to state regulation, courts
generally place the speech and regulation in question into a pre-
established category and then employ a test of constitutionality that is
specific to the pertinent category. This category approach has been
subject to cogent criticism .... [S]ome commentators have charged that,
as developed and applied by the Supreme Court, the category approach
has become both doctrinally incoherent and insufficiently attentive to the
values underlying the First Amendment. Yet despite this approach's
shortcomings, there is no indication that courts will abandon it in the
foreseeable future. Largely for that reason, I will take the category
approach, at least in its broad outline and rationale, as a given.97
Professor Netanel's candor is exemplary, his grasp of the problem is
keen, but his resolution of the issue is disturbing. These are not the words
of Morris Cohen. The notion that doctrine should be taken for granted
because it is doctrine is anathema to realism-indeed, to consequentialism
generally. One could just as well say that the reproduction right and term
extension have been subject to cogent criticism, and that the notion of a
derivative work is incoherent, but that because they are what we have to
work with, we might as well live with them.
I do not want to criticize Professor Netanel for not doing things he did
not set out to do. The article containing the passage just quoted is basically
a brief designed to show judges how to do what Professor Netanel thinks
they should do-which is to use free-speech rhetoric to tailor the drafting
and application of copyright law to favor the interests of downstream users
more than the law currently does. It would also be unfair to label Professor
Netanel as no more than a brief writer, however. His work as a whole
develops a normative (and largely realist) vision of free expression and the
institutions (such as mass media) and laws that contribute to it. His notion
96. See Leiter, supra note 25, at 282-84.
97. Netanel, Skein, supra note 17, at 31-32.
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of "democratic civil society" might be implemented in many ways, from
granting small speakers access to resources such as cable channels to
limiting the concentration of media firms to writing statutes differently. My
point is that when this idea is made concrete in free-speech terms, the
normative and realist discussion stops, and formalism takes over.
Professor Netanel is not alone in combining (in his case across works) a
normative critique with free-speech doctrinalism. Indeed, he stands out
more for his candor in acknowledging the flaws in the doctrines he relies on
(which is why I call the quotation "exemplary") than in his reliance.
Nevertheless, taken as a whole, it is odd to see a generally realist critique
embrace free-speech formalism. This odd combination makes explicit a
point that emerges from the earlier discussion as well: There is a realist
ratchet at work in the free-speech critique of copyright. Realism is good for
some things, such as deconstructing state action and autonomy, but not for
others, such as cutting through the Court's baroque doctrinal structures to
the facts of the cases and the conflicting values they reveal. The critique
can start with realism, so long as it ends with the linguistic wreckage of
Mosley.
Why does the ratchet turn the way it turns? What is it about the
formalism of free-speech doctrine that helps the free-speech critique of
copyright? I believe free-speech formalism helps the critique because the
Court's doctrines presume a conflict between speech and some other value.
The doctrines are not meant to decide cases in which one speaker
challenges another. To take them as they are given is to elide this fact.98
I believe this fact is fatal to the free-speech critique. At the risk of being
a bore, I repeat: One cannot invoke current doctrine on behalf of Michael
Moore without either asserting that Pete Townshend has no speech rights,
or pointing to a metric showing why his rights are weaker than Moore's.
Current doctrine provides no basis for either conclusion. It cannot resolve
this dispute, especially when it is taken for granted.
For the most part, however, advocates of the free-speech critique have
not provided reasons for favoring one speaker over another. They have
argued as if only one speech interest was at stake, but they have not
explained why. This omission is perplexing. Advocates of the critique do
seem to agree that the meaning of a work may change over time and that
people may attempt to manage those changes, so that meaning is a dynamic
concept.
For example, in the very first paragraph of his extremely learned
contribution to the critique, Professor Netanel describes a recent dispute,
SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., in which the trustees of Margaret
Mitchell's estate sued Alice Randall, who sought to trash Mitchell's Gone
with the Wind by copying substantial portions of it for her book The Wind
98. It also worsens the bad aspects of the doctrines. They are already disconnected from
the situations to which they are applied; to apply them to conflicts between speakers is to
increase the distance between them and the situations to which they are applied.
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Done Gone.99 He refers to Ms. Randall's claim that she "wrote her parodic
sequel, a work laced with miscegenation and slaves' calculated
manipulation of their masters, in order to 'explode' the racist stereotypes
and romantic portrait of antebellum plantation life perpetuated by
Mitchell's mythic tale."' 10 0
"Perpetuated" is an apt word. The trustees of Margaret Mitchell's estate
did not want her work trashed; they sued to defend the meaning of the book
as they saw it and as they wanted others to see it. The fight between the
parties was not a fight between speech and state, but a fight between
speakers over who would get to try to influence public perceptions of Gone
with the Wind and how they would get to try. Once one grants this point,
which Randall herself stressed, there is no way to deny that the case
represents a conflict between speech interests.
Nevertheless, I am not aware of any of the many discussions of the case
that treat the Mitchell estate as having any free-speech stake of its own.
When Professor Netanel returns to the point, he says that courts should use
the First Amendment to influence fair use analysis, and that "[c]opyright
holder control should not extend to preventing reformulations that serve as
highly effective critical commentary on the original."' 1 1 No longer do the
trustees perpetuate meaning; they just suppress it. The first formulation
was right, the second is not, and the first undercuts the arguments advanced
for the second.
I think free-speech formalism contributes to this tendency to recognize as
a factual matter that authors may be able to manage the meaning of a work,
but to ignore this fact when it comes to the law. After all, the doctrines
make no mention of the fact, so one need not confront it in reciting phrases
like "intermediate scrutiny." There are two levels of irony in this. One,
which I mentioned before, is that such blinkered reliance on doctrine is
exactly what realists inveighed against. The other is that Mosley-like
categories and tiers of scrutiny are designed to flush out unequal treatment
and the bad motives such treatment implies, not to balance interests in
conflicts between members of the same class. As applied to disputes
between speakers, they systematically treat members of the same class
differently.
Against this, one might argue that even if the Mitchell estate and Ms.
Randall both have speech interests, they are not similarly situated-Ms.
Randall's interests are greater. I have said that the free-speech critique does
not supply this argument, as The Wind Done Gone example illustrates.
There is one argument in the critique that can be read as distinguishing
between speakers, however. I do not think it succeeds, but it provides an
99. SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 252 F.3d 1165 (11th Cir. 2001); Netanel,
Skein, supra note 17, at 2.
100. Netanel, Skein, supra note 17, at 2..
101. Id. at 83.
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interesting perspective on the relationship between the critique and legal
realism.
Here is the argument. In Associated Press v. United States,102 Justice
Hugo Black wrote that the First Amendment values both "the widest
possible dissemination of information" and the dissemination of such
information from "diverse and antagonistic sources."10 3 Many advocates of
the critique claim that this phrase establishes a free-speech principle. 0 4 In
other work I have explained why I think this phrase cannot bear the weight
they want to put upon it.10 5 I do not want to rehearse those reasons here. I
do want to explore briefly what these words meant in the situation to which
they were applied, and what they might mean when taken out of context-
as the critique does-and applied to other situations.
Justice Black's language did not address a conflict between speakers of
the kind we see in the example of Townshend and Moore, and in the
SunTrust case. There was no fight over the meaning of a popular work.
The conflict was between newspapers-those that wanted to join the
Associated Press and member papers that wanted to restrict membership.
Much of the content at issue in the case was homogenous-re-
publication of stories from member papers-so "diverse and antagonistic"
cannot be read as referring to the content at issue. Those terms are best read
as referring to the papers themselves; they are a way of expressing in free-
speech terms Justice Black's robust populism. 10 6 The point of the passage,
to the extent it has any point other than as free-speech frosting on an
antitrust cake, was to emphasize Justice Black's belief that the law should
protect small businesses over big ones. 10 7
What might this language mean apart from the antitrust context to which
it pertains? The notion of wide dissemination of information has little
relevance here, unless one interprets it to mean that free-speech doctrine
protects all those who wish to distribute a work. That meaning is consistent
102. 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
103. Id. at 20.
104. E.g. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and 'Market Power' in the Marketplace of
Ideas 158-59 (2004), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-721281 [hereinafter Market
Power]; Netanel, Skein, supra note 17, at 64, n.272; Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a Model
for Free Speech Law: What Copyright Has in Common with Anti-pornography Laws,
Campaign Finance Reform, and Telecommunications Regulation, 42 B.C. L. Rev. 1, 57
(2000).
105. McGowan, supra note 44, at 309-13.
106. On Justice Black's populism, see Roger K. Newman, Hugo Black 6-13 (1994); see
also Justice Black Dies at 85; Served on the Court for 34 Years, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1971,
at Al. At the height of the mid-1960s small-dealer merger rulings, Fortune magazine
reportedly dubbed Black's relentless opposition to mergers "Antitrust in a Coonskin Cap."
Arthur Austin, Book Review, 56 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 193, 202-03 (1987) (reviewing Ernest
Gellhorn, Antitrust Law and Economics (1986)).
107. His opinion did the opposite, McGowan, supra note 44, at 311-12, but that was a
predictable result of his approach to antitrust law. See, e.g., United States v. Von's Grocery
Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); see also Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law 129 (2d ed. 2001)
(explaining harm to small firms of approaches reflected in the Von 's case).
2005]
FORDHAM LA W REVIEW
with the facts of the case, but as applied to copyright it implies that the
reproduction right itself is unconstitutional. Cogent as it is, few people
want to make that claim. 108
The notion of "diverse" sources is ambiguous. It could mean the largest
number of people, which is in fact the most natural reading if we cast an eye
back to Justice Black's concern to keep alive as many small papers as he
could. "Diverse" could also be read to refer to the greatest variety of
different types of people, though what counts as a type remains an open
question. Either reading puts the reproduction right at risk again.
It would be possible to avoid this implication by straddling the fence
between sources and content. One could simply say that doing away with
the reproduction right would be bad for speech, but so would penalizing
authors like Alice Randall-so one's speech rights correlate with the degree
to which one transforms a work, in addition to copying it.109 The First
Amendment should be read not to promote either the diversity of expression
as such or the sheer number of speakers, but to try to establish the socially
optimal equilibrium between participation and originality. 110
This straddle is an appealing idea, but a diffuse one. Its appeal lies
largely in its diffuseness. Because on the critique's own account both
participation and diversity of expression are speech interests, a judge would
have to invoke some principle of weighting that the critique does not
specify. How much variance should be sacrificed for what level of
participation? The equilibrium idea does not itself help judges answer this
question, and therefore offers neither guidance nor constraint in determining
when the equilibrium has been reached. Certainly nothing in the doctrines
we are to take as given provide guidance on this question. It is hard to see
how the equilibrium idea could help a judge analyze a case, rather than give
her rhetorical cover to do whatever she wants.
One might try to solve this problem by invoking the distinction between
parody and satire, so that works that attack an existing work, such as The
Wind Done Gone, have greater rights than works that do not, such as
Tarantino's film and Moore's. One could argue that it is hard to attack a
work without copying a lot of it, so there are fewer good substitutes that
108. See Tushnet, supra note 16, at 547 (stressing that she does not make such a claim).
But cf Baker, supra note 31 (making that claim).
109. Market Power, supra note 104, at 159.
110. Professor Netanel argues that this is a point I missed previously. Id at 159 n.53. I do
not think so. My point both then and now is that neither free-speech theory nor doctrine
provides a premise for limiting copyright power in such cases. That both diversity and
participation are speech values does not refute this claim. Indeed, that argument presumes
that only Moore or Randall participate, while ignoring the choices made by Townshend and
the trustees of the Mitchell estate, even though those choices rationally relate to a free-
speech value-the coherence of a message an author wants to express. Even ignoring such
choices, however, to point out that participation and variety may trade off simply raises the
question of what decides between the two when they conflict. My claim is that a theory of
free speech does not provide a mechanism of decision, unless one wishes to incorporate into




could serve as inputs for such an attack than there are for other types of
works. One could relate the scarcity of good substitutes for such attacks to
the free-speech question of whether a regulation of speech leaves open
"ample alternative channels of communication."'111
This argument is part of the economic analysis of fair use,11 2 so one does
not need free-speech to get here. But at first glance, there seems to be no
harm in connecting it to the First Amendment. In Associated Press terms,
the claim is that participation should be weighted more heavily when not
much diversity can be achieved anyway. 113
The problem, however, is that this argument continues to duck the speech
issue by presuming that "participation" is a one-way street. The argument
presumes that Alice Randall participates, but the Mitchell estate does not.
That is just wrong. When the trustees of the Mitchell estate try to manage
the modem meaning of Gone with the Wind, they participate in whatever
one wants to call the aggregate of speech acts-be it democratic civil
society or the creation of common culture. That is in fact precisely the
objection Ms. Randall raises: The Mitchell trustees are trying to preserve
("perpetuate" in Professor Netanel's terms) a meaning she does not like. If
their acts were unrelated to the public's impressions of Gone with the Wind,
she would have no such objection. 114
That leaves "antagonistic," which seems more promising. Justice Black
used the word to refer to sources, but an antagonistic source is likely to
produce antagonistic content, so it is not too much of a stretch to apply it to
uses such as Randall's. Dissent is a strong part of the free-speech tradition.
It generally refers to dissent against government measures rather than
novels, but the concept is malleable enough to stand a little expansion.
Not too much though. For this argument to work, it is important that
whatever Townshend and the trustees of the Mitchell estate are doing, it
must not count as "dissent." Why doesn't the view of the Mitchell trustees
count as dissent against the prevailing orthodoxy of racial equality, or
political correctness, however? Why doesn't Randall's trashing impair that
dissenting voice? Townshend's voice seems clearly intended to dissent
against heavy-handed demagoguery; to allow (what he might see as) a
heavy-handed demagogue to appropriate that message will tend to diminish
it.
111. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 802 (1989).
112. Richard A. Posner, When Is Parody Fair Use?, 21 J. Legal Stud. 67, 67-68 (1992)
(suggesting a narrow scope for fair use that attacks a work, though not for a use that uses a
work to attack something else).
113. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
114. It is true that the trustees might fail in their efforts to influence understandings, but,
as noted earlier, so might Ms. Randall. The risk of failure does not imply that efforts to
manage meaning are not participation (if it did neither would be a speaker); the classification
of "speaker" has to be fleshed out by analysis of the relationship between choices, actions,
and free-speech values.
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The free-speech critique seems to insist that only the marginal speaker is
a dissenter, but it does not provide reasons grounded in the First
Amendment to understand the concept of dissent that way. The reading is
counterintuitive. It tends to reflect a static, and, therefore, unrealistic, view
of how expression can be managed over time. Because meanings depend
on contexts, and because the facts that constitute contexts are constantly
changing, both rights holders and those who would copy from them are
marginal speakers; they both try to influence the way people understand a
work. It is true that one speaker would make more copies than the other,
but unless there are reasons why the coherence of a message should be
given no free-speech weight, this fact does not make one speaker a dissenter
and the other not. 115 It may be true that Townshend would have let Moore
have his way for a price, but it remains the case that, if the law allows him
to safeguard its meaning and he actually does so, Townshend's work can
stand as criticism of Moore's approach to making movies.
It is possible to draw on Justice Black's populism to support a different
meaning of dissent. One could stipulate that dissent takes place only when
the powerless speak out against the powerful. Big companies oppress; the
little guy dissents. To one degree or another, this idea does appear in the
free-speech critique. It appears in Professor Lawrence Lessig's
condemnations of "big media," 116 Professor Benkler's opposition to giving
speech rights to corporations, 117 and Professor Netanel's suspicion of media
concentration, as well as his bringing into the critique Professor Steven
Shiffrin's claim that free speech favors expression of the "'fears, hopes, and
aspirations of the less powerful to those in power,"' 118 an expression that is
most naturally read to refer to government officials, but which can also be
read to refer to private economic power.
Professor Jack Balkin is most explicit on this point. To the quite accurate
claim that the free-speech critique is a type of modem "Lochnerism," whose
advocates wish to persuade the Court to read into the Constitution a set of
policies they prefer, trumping laws produced by more representative
branches in response to technological and other economic changes, 119 he
objects that in this argument
115. And, as noted above, the act of copying is not itself valuable in terms of speech.
Lots of unprotected speech acts can be copied; fraudulent investment prospectuses are
copied all the time. The value inheres in what is being copied, how it is being copied, and
how this combination contributes to values we interpret the First Amendment to embody.
116. Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture: How Big Media Uses Technology and the Law to
Lock Down Culture and Control Creativity 57-58 (2004),
117. Yochai Benkler, Through the Looking Glass: Alice and the Constitutional
Foundations of the Public Domain, Law & Contemp. Probs., Winter/Spring 2003, at 173,
223.
118. Market Power, supra note 104, at 159 (quoting Steven H. Shiffrin, Dissent, Injustice,
and the Meanings of America, at xi (1999)).
119. Paul M. Schwartz & William Michael Treanor, Eldred and Lochner: Copyright




small-scale artists, software programmers, Intemet end users, and
consumers who seek a robust public domain are the functional equivalent
of the Robber Barons and concentrated economic interests of the Gilded
Age, while today's media corporations like Microsoft, Disney and
Viacom are the functional equivalent of immigrant laborers in sweatshops
at the turn of the century. 120
In other words, what really matters is who wins, not why.121
I think this move should be rejected on both the facts and logic of the
matter. On the facts, even if one likes the idea of an overtly populist (or
progressive in the most partisan sense) First Amendment, that idea fits
poorly with the facts of the cases we have examined here. The defendant in
The Wind Done Gone case was the Houghton Mifflin Company. Michael
Moore's film was funded by the Walt Disney Corporation, which elsewhere
serves as the Darth Vader of the critique.' 2 2  The most popular
expression-the most likely candidates for what Professor Tushnet refers to
as common culture-will be produced by the type of firms populist
ideology condemns.123
At a logical level, even if one accepts that free speech is itself a partisan
stance, 124 no theory of free speech can withstand the incorporation of too
much overt partisanship, either of the "soak-the-rich" variety or any other.
Populist politics and free-speech theory overlap, but by no stretch of the
imagination are they the same. Every other brand of politics overlaps with
free-speech theory, too. The theory provides no basis for giving favored
status to any of them; that is closer to what it decries. First Amendment
doctrine does not allocate rights based on wealth or power, a point on which
the context-insensitivity of the doctrine hurts the critique rather than helps
it. Those with money and power can do more with rights than those
without, but unless we treat speech as state action, which no coherent
120. Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 27 n.46 (2004).
121. Professor Balkin is admirably straightforward in professing this view. This is also
true of his contribution to the collectivist free-speech debate that preceded this one,
regarding restrictions on racist speech. Balkin, supra note 21, at 386-87. It is interesting
that, in this earlier work, Professor Balkin ties the notion of dissent to the sort of populist
egalitarianism I discuss in the text. Id. at 387.
122. Mary Corliss, A First Look at "Fahrenheit 9/11, " Time Online Edition, May 17,
2004, http://www.time.com/time/arts/article/0,8599,638819,00.html. One comment on this
paper insisted that I mention that Disney did not want to distribute Moore's film, presumably
because it thought the content too controversial. That is true but irrelevant to the point that
all speakers in these examples are rich. The movie was distributed by Lion's Gate Films, a
company with 2004 revenues of $384,891,000. See Lion's Gate Entm't, Annual Report '04,
at 87 (2004) available at http://www.lionsgatefilms.com/investors/pdf/LGF2004.pdf.
123. While it is true that, as digital technology and networks drive down the cost of
distributing content, populist ideology may fit the facts of a larger fraction of the relevant
cases, the fundamental objections to an overtly ideological First Amendment remain.
124. See generally Stanley Fish, There's No Such Thing as Free Speech and It's a Good
Thing, Too 116-19 (1994).
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speech doctrine can, that fact does not justify reading populist policies into
the Constitution. 125
CONCLUSION
The upshot of all this is that the free-speech critique trades on the
formalistic weakness of free-speech doctrine to avoid dealing with a
conflict between speech interests. It takes judicial language out of
context, 126 and, when pressed, asserts a populist version of realism that
insists that the less powerful in society have greater speech rights than the
more powerful, because the less powerful have to be able to copy if they are
to speak.
This half-hearted realism discounts the speech interests it does not like
and, therefore, does not achieve the goals of realists such as Cohen and
Hale. Those scholars employed realist methods to strip away ambiguous
language and diffuse concepts, such as property, to get at the human
interactions at issue in concrete cases. 127  As Hale's employer and
employee coerce each other, so infringement plaintiffs and defendants fight
for different meanings. For rock-ribbed conservatism expressed through
words like "property" and "contract," the critique exchanges equally rock-
ribbed progressivism.
In the process, I think the critique degrades the concept of realism it
partly employs. Realism is a way of looking at the law and a call to
investigate certain facts. It is a method-a way of doing law-not an
ideology. Many realists advocated progressive policies, but to cast the free-
speech critique as realist in the sense that it gives the weak in society a
boost is to strip away from realism what is of genuine value to the law.
Hale's theory of coercion draws attention to a Hobbesian world in which
real suffering occurs; it fails because, if everything is coercion, then the
concept of coercion cannot distinguish situations or decide cases. 128 If the
free-speech critique embraced realism fully, it would encounter the same
fate. When speech interests pervade a case, they cannot decide it. That is a
realistic look at the free-speech critique.
125. It is notable in this regard that in trying to deflect the too-close-to-home charge of
"Lochnerism," Professor Balkin tries to spin judicial rejection of the critique (in Eldred) as
akin to cases in which the government outlawed dissent. Balkin, supra note 120, at 27 n.46.
126. This is mitigated by the fact that free-speech doctrine is itself largely indifferent to
context.
127. That is what should be at issue. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Privilege, Malice,
and Intent, 8 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1894).
128. See Richard Epstein, The Assault that Failed: The Progressive Critique of Laissez
Faire, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 1697 (1999).
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APPENDIX: OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES
In order to keep the argument in the text focused, I have tried to
acknowledge and respond to only those arguments that bear on my
discussion of realism and the free-speech critique. Over the past couple of
years I have heard a large number of interesting objections to my general
approach, some of which may have come to your mind as you read this
Essay. I therefore take a moment here to state the most significant of those
objections and respond to them.
Apart from one scholar's explanation that "your argument made me want
to puke," the objections I hear generally begin with some phrase such as
"you just don't get it." So you may wish to imply that phrase before each
objection, as follows.
You just don't get that:
Sometimes copying is necessary for people to speak at all.
I think this objection is right. It does not follow, however, that an author
such as Rafferty, Townshend, or the trustees of the Mitchell estate have no
speech interests. My only claim is that the First Amendment does not
supply a premise that can resolve conflicts among speakers, so I do not
think this assertion refutes it. The assertion just ignores one speech claim in
favor of another.
I also think there are relatively few cases in which copying is necessary
in the sense that a work could not be done without it. It depends on the
point being made. One can quote Justice Louis Brandeis to make a point
about individualism, one could quote someone else, or one could just make
the point directly. 129 Moore got along fine without Townshend's music.
One can even write biographies without quoting the subject's works, 130
though I would agree that in such cases the quality of a downstream work
would suffer more from an inability to copy than would be the case for
Michael Moore. Saying that copying is "necessary" would be closer to the
truth in such cases. Some examples, such as Professor Tushnet's example
of reciting religious texts to affirm one's belief, make out a strong case of
necessity, though I would find it odd to base free-speech doctrine on such
an unrepresentative speech act (however, the example does offer an
interesting window on the critique's notion of autonomy).
129. This is part of my response to what I see as Professor Tushnet's exaggerated view of
the need to copy. Tushnet, supra note 16, at 574-78. (The other part is that it is odd to make
this argument about a quotation from a judicial opinion when the thesis of your article is that
context matters greatly to free speech and copyright law.)
130. See Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 96 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 890 (1987).
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Ifpeople can't copy, there will be a hole in their intended expression. 131
This is a milder version of the previous criticism. It, too, is right, though
detached from any concept of necessity, it has no logical stopping point
short of the abolition of the reproduction right. No one wants that, but
neither does free-speech theory or doctrine provide a logical stopping point
for this argument once it gets going. It is an invitation to balance, which
makes it important to recognize what is being balanced. Like the previous
criticism, this objection presumes there is only one speech interest at stake
in a case. The hole in Tarantino's expression might well become a smear
distorting Rafferty's if the law reverses position, so this criticism gets little
traction.
Public discourse would be impoverished without copying.
This is a more diffuse version of the first two objections. It too ignores
speech interests such as Townshend's, and it trades on an ambiguous
concept. It does not justify the free-speech critique. I personally think the
point is right, however. I prefer a world with The Wind Done Gone to a
world without it. What I cannot do is make free-speech theory produce that
result.
Margaret Mitchell is dead. She has no speech interests.
There is no arguing with the premise here, and I share the intuition that
dead authors have fewer interests (at least dignitary interests) at stake in
fights over expression. That might justify discounting the participation
interests of the Mitchell estate. But if we follow the critique's
deconstruction of the notion of autonomy, it is hard to see why it would. If
everyone is in some sense channeling the words of others, then that the
trustees of the Mitchell estate do so provides no basis for singling them out.
The trustees are fighting for Ms. Mitchell's vision, which is distinct from
other visions such as Ms. Randall's, so the diversity interest remains the
same.
Pete Townshend is just greedy. He has no speech interests.
It would be possible to state this argument through innuendo and
abstraction, but that tactic would boil down to this blunter version, which
makes it easier to see that it is part ad hominem and part non sequitur.
Nevertheless, I can see the appeal of part of the argument. A rights
holder who does not try to control the meaning of a work, but instead agrees
to any use so long as the money is right, seems less interested in
contributing a distinct message to public debate than do the trustees of the
Mitchell estate. I could imagine arguments along this line for




distinguishing among speakers. Such arguments would have to deal with
the fact that revenue maximization promotes expression, however, and they
would create incentives that, from the perspective of the critique, are
perverse (you are worse off the more uses you agree to).
Even if Townshend or the trustees of the Mitchell estate have speech
interests, you have not shown that their interests outweigh the interests of
downstream transformative users like Moore or Randall.
I think this criticism is right, but that it cuts both ways and is irrelevant to
my thesis. On the first point, the free-speech critique has so determinedly
asserted that the copyright glass is half-empty that I am aware of no work
that both advances some form of the critique and treats rights holders as
speakers. For that reason, the critique offers no reason to believe that
Moore's interests should be weighted more heavily than Townshend's
(even aggregated across all speakers). Put differently, if the free-speech
critique asserts that some sort of weighing methodology is vital to an
argument about copyright and free speech, then it fails its own test. On the
second point, I do not claim that the interests of Townshend outweigh
Moore. I am as conventionally socialized as anyone else, so my reflex is to
treat Moore's interests as more important than Townshend's. Reflexes are
not theories, however, nor are they reasons. I do claim that no theory of
speech, as a theory of speech, provides a premise for deciding that issue.
The law already recognizes a form of "asymmetrical speech theory"
because the copyright term is limited. That means that authors get only so
long to establish their meaning, after which users get to try to alter it. And
as a practical matter most works that will have a recognizable meaning will
attain it fairly quickly, and it will be strong enough to retain its coherence
in the face of works such as The Wind Done Gone, which means that
allowing transformative copying will add to the diversity of speech without
reducing its coherence, which is an obvious net gain.
These points were made in comments from Professor Justin Hughes (the
phrase "asymmetrical speech theory" is his).132 I have no quarrel with
policy judgments that give authors a limited time to get their message
across. If I had my way, we would have an initial term of about a year,
with formalities and the chance of indefinite renewal at roughly twenty-year
intervals. That seems like good policy to me. But this judgment is not
grounded in a theory of why speech is important enough to get special
status among the universe of legislative objects.
132. They reflect themes in his work. See Justin Hughes, Fair Use Across Time, 50
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 775, 795-96 (2003) (making the point that diversity and coherence need
not trade off); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 Geo. L. J. 287,
364-65 (1988) (same).
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More practically, I do not doubt that most works have no readily
recognizable meaning after a relatively short period of time, but those are
not the works that create cases such as SunTrust. It is the subset of works
for which meanings do persist that create such cases, and it is in that subset
that the conflict among interests is most keen. I would tend to agree that
works in this subset have such stable meanings that works such as Ms.
Randall's will do little to dislodge them, but that is an empirical intuition
based on a subjective evaluation of expression. Courts are not well suited
to make such empirical judgments, and subjective evaluation of the status
of expression is closer to the evil the First Amendment is aimed to avoid
than to the promise it hopes to achieve.
All this talk of theory is rubbish. There is no free-speech principle, so the
fact that it cannot distinguish between "speakers" means nothing. There is
nothing wrong with interpreting the First Amendment ideologically because
all interpretations of it are ideological. You may not like the ideology of the
critique, but so what? All that is at stake is whether this particular law
helps the rich get richer, or whether it gives powerless people some power.
Sad to say, I think a lot of this objection is right. I certainly dislike
populism, though I have tried not to let that dislike infect my logic too
much. Certainly people who want to restrict speech view the First
Amendment as little more than an exercise of raw power by people who
like pornography and hate religion. I do not agree that free-speech theories
are worthless; they at least put positions to the test of reason. That is our
job. It is true that they do not establish objective truth with regard to
speech, which means that our jobs are destined to produce frustration. But
that is no reason not to insist that diffuse phrases be made concrete and that
arguments be followed where their logic leads.
My main response to this objection in this context, however, is that this is
not what the free-speech critique says. The critique presents itself as a
theory rather than an attack on theory. More fundamentally (if you will
pardon the pun), this sort of anti-foundationalism pulls the rug out from
under the critique itself. If power is all there is, then there is no basis for
complaining about the way it has been exercised. The entire critique would
boil down to a dirge for the legislative failures of the copyright left. Maybe
that is the most realistic take of all.
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